# SINGLE PARTY MILITARIZATION. CASE STUDY: NATIONAL GUARD – THE ARMED HAND OF NATIONAL RENAISSANCE FRONT

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Abstract. The single party was the militarized political institution of the new authoritarian regime lead by King Carol II by using the armed hand of single organization in the state, The National Guard. The militarization of policy represented the main dimension of the regime and the state architecture revealed the single party capacity to militarize the administrative institutions.

The architecture of the National Renaissance Front was similar to a military unit, the official attributions of the Guard consisted in the maintenance of order in the territory, and the unofficial regarded the monitoring of members and opposing of the party and regime, by control and surveillance activity. The National Guard was the politicized institution of the regime and the single party which proved its inefficiency because of the commandant general subordination to the single party. Militaries lead the single organization as well as the National Guard.

Keywords: militarization, recruitment, bureaucracy, single party, (anti)propaganda, National Guard.

#### INTRODUCTION

The present article intends to analyze, by means of an interdisciplinary perspective by using political science references as well as archive information and époque's legislation, projected in the comparative method, the modality how was created a paramilitary institution serving the political interests of the single party, under the mono-party political regime. Our study emphasizes on the National Guard institution Architecture as well as on relations between National Renaissance Front (NRF) and the National Guard. On the one hand, there will be critically analyzed the Guard units by exploiting archive documents which proved the National Guard disposed of a Service for Information and Propaganda, meaning, as we will see further, it did political police work. On the other hand, the study also analyzes the incompatibilities between the single party and the Guard, as well as the selection "criteria" on persons intending to enrol, by using a study case on the recruitment and assigning of young elements in the leading structures of NRF.

What signified the National Guard for a single political party? Why the authority regimes have such military instruments serving to the resolution of some political interests? These are the interrogations we will try to answer and to prove

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meaning the monarchic authority regime created institutions and politicized in order to control the whole state and party clerk apparatus. The dissemination of the regime's ideology represented the mission of the single party and instruments it was endowed: the National Guard. The single party by its supporting institutions, particularly the National Guard, created an arbitrary political regime by politicizing state and party bureaucracy. The militarist characteristics of single organization defined the party and regime as having the armed forces support.

#### ABOUT THE POLITICS MILITARIZATION

The political and armed instrument of National Renaissance Front was the National Guard of the single party. In regard to the National Guard there can be stated it wanted to be a substitute of the Iron Guard. Its almost identical name reveals this axiom. By creating the National Guard, the soldier has not fulfilled his mission as military but embraced the political tasks mission he was endowed with by the new regime. The theoretical reference of historian Armin Heinen, as ,,the authoritarian regimes needs the armed forces support and the Romanian royal dictatorship was not an exception of this", must be proved by the development of the state institutions' militarization term by the presence in the leading structures of the single party. The prefects and mayors were active or retired colonels or generals of the Romanian Armed Forces appointed or assigned in positions by royal decree. The politicization of Guard institution was accomplished by the mean of Front's clerks and ideology. In those times, there was the saying "the Guard was not an organization similar to the pattern used by political parties wherein all was reduced to the whetting of humans against other humans"<sup>2</sup>. The allusion referred to the political chaos installed by the plurality of political organizations meaning the decay and immorality of Parliamentary and politics.

The apparition of militaries in politics and party shows the presence of a political regime without legitimacy marked by economic and social challenges it was incapable to administrate. The militaries were organized and hierarchically disciplined, endowed with corporative and soldierly spirit and promoted mutual communication and owing the force of the arms, they often represent the strongest structure of society. The military intervention seems justified when it is done in the name of national interest and security in order to avoid the release of civil war or for economic and social modernization processes<sup>3</sup>. The armed forces and the single

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Armin Heinen, Legiunea "Arhanghelului Mihail". Mișcare socială și organizație politică. O contribuție la problema fascismului internațional, Ediția a II-a, Editura Humanitas, București, 2006, pp. 341–42.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Solemnitatea depunerii jurământului comandanților de ținut ai gărzilor naționale. Cuvântarea lui A. Călinescu", *Universul*, anul al 56-lea, nr. 119 din 4 mai 1939, p. 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Domenico Fisichella, *Știința Politică. Probleme, Concepte, Teorii*, translated from Italian and post-face of Victor Muraru, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 362.

party protect, legitimate and do organizational and functional actions, from propaganda to cultural activities, from economic modernization to actions in the legislative field<sup>4</sup>.

The construction of the second armed paramilitary force was represented by the apparition of the NRF auxiliary organization which was leaded by elements of the armed forces or former officers who adhered to the single party. The Guard's units were lead by commandants assigned from NRF members and the active and former officers of the Romanian Armed Forces were preferred. Thus, the capital commandant, the commandants from territory and county commandants were appointed into functions to the proposal of the Ministry of Interior by royal decree. All the other commandants of city centres or village were assigned by the decision of the Commandant-General. Not everybody could be commandant, but those who successfully attended to the commandants' courses".

The Commandant-General represented the permanent leadership body of the Guard and in this respect he accomplished the function as member of NRF Superior Council. The general was helped to lead the Guard by a major staff assigned by royal decree from the former superior officers of the active armed forces.

The Guard major staff had a Service of Propaganda with attributions in the collection of information on the spirit situation in country, issues of mutual interests and the NRF principles and goals, as well as the propaganda by periodicals concerning this organization<sup>6</sup>.

The authoritarian regimes, with military characteristics by its officers, control the governing act which is thus lacked by any specific ideology and acts grounded on prevailing pragmatic issues into the limits of bureaucratic mentality limits specific for militaries and civilians in the presence of a single mass party sponsored by the powers, which can be more present in order to occupy the political space to diminish the population's participation in the political life rather then in order to mobilize the population even in a controlled action<sup>7</sup>. In this respect, "the role of National Guards was to be called to keep close contact with the popular masses with the duty to guide, orient and to remediate an hour earlier against the agitators requesting the peoples the adhesion to foreign organizations, contrary to the national interests".

About the National Guard role, the historian Nicolae Iorga, royal counsellor, also expressed considering the "Front, with its National Guard, is all can be best for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 364

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>, Regulamentul pentru organizarea și funcționarea Gărzii Naționale", *Universul*, anul al 56-lea nr.111, din 26 aprilie 1939, p. 9, vezi și A.N.I.C, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 171/1939, pp. 2–3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ibidem, p. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Domenico Fisichella, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> "Depunerea jurământului comandanților de Gărzi FRN din Ținutul Bucegi", *Universul*, anul al 56-lea, nr.123 din 8 mai 1939, p. 15.

the monarchy, and the Crown must find mobilization also in other forces then the mobilized masses of some demagogues. The country supported the Crown by Front, firstly, but the Crown must support on a free Parliament". The critical attitude of historian Nicolae Iorga against the regime and the party lead by King Carol II is observable by his position related to the necessity to fundament the regime in order to revive the Parliament institution and the reintroduction of fundamental liberties of citizens, suspended by siege state decree introducing the censorship<sup>10</sup>.

On the one hand, the mobilization can train limited sequels of populations at elite level or can be applied to masses when the mobilization is decided by the population previously mobilized in a more competitive political situation but lacking of political institutions able to satisfy requirements generated by mobilization or to guarantee the development of steady processes of social and political change<sup>11</sup>. On the other hand, the agitated population from political regard is settled down by the installed authoritarian regime sometimes inducing the citizens to forms of apathy and detachment. Basically, the regime requests to the population not to involve in politics<sup>12</sup>. Domenico Fisichella analyzing the mobilization authoritarian regimes reaches to the conclusion that for these regimes ,,the temptation to train social masses in political processes is greater, still without the mobilization to reach to comprise human in his multitude of dimensions: to the authoritarianisms is enough the training and support of peoples as political subjects in their political posture but not as complete subjects<sup>13</sup>.

Militaries coordinated the NRF activity with the role to monitor the party's members inside and outside the single political organization. The goal was represented by the mobilization of the individuals around the king against the legionaries and communist propaganda agitating the spirits of youth and workers.

Other dimension of NRF is represented by the single party lying on professional grounds as effect of organic state and corporative constitutional order representing the expression of public preoccupations and completed with own Guard as interior discipline and order instrument. Thus, "NRF represented the means how the Nation expressed its thoughts and was the reservoir from which, by severe selection of elites, there will be recruited elements for country's leadership" <sup>14</sup>. The National Renaissance Front reason to exist was, at one hand, "the members of the Front to convince the popular masses by direct contact, to propagate the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Nicolae Iorga, "Desbaterile parlamentare", Senatul, ședința din 28 iunie 1939, în *Monitorul Oficial*, nr. 9, partea a III-a, Imprimeria Centrală, București, 1939, p. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Decretul Regal, Nr. 856, "Instaurarea stării de asediu", *Monitorul Oficial*, Nr. 34 din 11 februarie 1938, pp. 1–2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Domenico Fisichella, op. cit., p. 359.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 359.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 368.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> "Aniversarea Noii Constituții, Cuvântarea lui A. Călinescu", *Universul*, anul al 56-lea, nr. 58 din 1 martie 1939, p. 3.

government acts related to the situations and, on the other hand, the National Renaissance Front will be able, by tentacled ramifications, to hear the heart of the crowd, to collect from the millions of modest homes the wills and wishes must be and have the right to be heard; these millions of souls must construct the whole which then becomes, by wise synthesis, the nation's will and wish". Therefore, the official ideology of the regime was exercised by the government on the population by the mean of National Guard and the single party members and with the support of residents from the counties. NRF represented the relation between individuals and local elites aiming to exercise the social mobilization by the mean of ideology.

#### THE NATIONAL GUARD ARCHITECTURE

NRF execution bodies were found in the hierarchical dependence relations in conformity with Article 22 of the NRF Organizational Regulation, meaning the hierarchy was settled on three professional categories. By all means, the General Secretary for intellectual occupations subordinated only the secretaries for intellectual occupations without authority over the ones from the agriculture and manual work. For the National Guard, the hierarchy was settled by Article 10 of National Guard Regulation recalled that "in it entered only the Guard's units commandants" 16. The general-commandant represented the permanent leadership body of the Guard. He embodied the whole activity of the Guard in regard to the directives received from the Front Directorate in conformity with Article 4 of National Guard Regulation. An important disposition is Article 35 of the National Guard Regulation which provisioned: "the use of National Guard units was done to the order of Generalcommandant and in situations of clear emergency and necessity and the Front Secretariat request to village, commune and region; for this, it was also requested the approval of NRF county Secretariat". The Guard was auxiliary body of NRF and the general-commandant of the National Guard guided its activity in regard to the directives received from the Directorate.

The Guard units missions consisted in: a) maintenance of order on the occasion of any type manifestations of NRF organizations; b) cooperation with the existent organizations in order to prepare for the passive defence against air attacks; c) collaboration with the Country's Watch and the Social Service; d) cooperation on wartime with military bodies to maintain the safety, peace and execution of an Information Service<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Cuvântarea lui Victor Vâlcovici", în *Țara Nouă prin Munca Tuturor, Biblioteca FRN*, Editat de Subsecretariatul de Stat al Propagandei, Imprimeria Statului, Bucureşti, 1939, p. 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, dosar 2/1939-1940, f. 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 151.

Candidates for the quality as member of the Guard must fulfil the following conditions: to be members of the Front; to be healthy; c) to have at least 23 years and at the most 50 years; d) to know how to write and read in Romanian; e) to have had good behaviour in the society<sup>19</sup>.

The major staff of the National Guard disposed of *Information and Propaganda Service* (see Annex no. 1) which was under the guidance of the *Technical Counsellor*. This service has as main attribution the collection of information of political nature which: a) referred to the activity of different politicians formal embedded or not embedded in NRF in order to be able to continue their activity to slander or defame the present regime sheltered by NRF organization; b) generally, the activity regarded any political action contrary to the NRF ideology and doctrine; c) this action sphere included any political-social trend, ideas and opinions publicly, hidden, person to person, verbally or written communication circulated; there were particularly regarded the former political officials who felt dismissed from NRF leadership or lost their use therefore either revenue source being unpleased with the simple quality as NRF members<sup>20</sup>. This information was acknowledged to the General Commandant and the territory centralising it on counties and kept evidences of those elements.

From the General Commandment of Nation's Party, the Information Service by the report on July 5, 1940, for the execution of the General Staff disposals, it can be noticed the Circles of Studies functioned in regard to collect information, for the existence of the Romanian state. There was necessary to create counterintelligence services disguised as *Service for Studies and Forecasts*<sup>21</sup>. Thus, the repartition was done on territorial administrative units: Bucharest – Sir Colonel Strat Nicolae – Bucegi Region; Cluj – Sir General Ivaşcu Gheorghe- Someş Region; Iaşi – Sir Colonel Constantin Dumitru – Prut Region. The commandants of the Counties' National Guards had to exercise also counterintelligence action directly depending on the three delegates<sup>22</sup>.

## THE ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FOR PLACE AND COMMUNE

The Commandant of Place and Commune National Guard was a body subordinated to the County Commandant. He searched for information and transmitted in brute form to the County's National Guard Commandant. The Place and Commune Commandant did not keep any written proofs or files in this regard. The collected information were orally transmitted or by informative notes without keeping any copy of it<sup>23</sup>. In Chapter IV of NRF Organizational Law there were recalled the counterintelligence means. The militarized methods practised by the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> A.N.I.C., Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, Dosar 171/1939, f. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, dosar 2/1939-1940, f. 326.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 327.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 327.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 328.

single party are not specific for a political organization but they are similar to the military units or even to the political police. Therefore the recruitment of undercover and residents informative agents was done from the National Guard members selected and corresponding to all requirements being able to enterprise a counterintelligence action.

These resident agents who were covered on occupational plan communicated directly with the respective commandment and could be known only by them. For their identification, the County Commandment could release some orders from a special notebook<sup>24</sup>. Which were the problems to follow? This was specified in Chapter V as: "political-social nature counterintelligence, the state of spirit of population, the activity of different politicians embedded or not in the Nation Party, actions opposing the Nation Party ideology and doctrine, ideas or opinions circulating person to person, orally or written, police or judiciary information, actions aiming the social order reconfiguration by terror acts, espionage, subversive actions, all was opposite to the internal and external safety of the state".

#### THE ANTI(PROPAGANDA) ACTIVITY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

The propaganda, ideological activity resulted in the fulfilment of the unity by the presentation of the King Carol II as real safeguard of the nation, and the royal paternalism promoted by the new regime around the leading elites effected in the mobilization of the national spirit by the National Guard.

We can say the ideology consumed its effects, under these circumstances, as it was supported by the official mass-media of the regime which formed the necessary mentalities for the new political, economic and social order of the 1938-1940 years Romania. NRF was source of propaganda with the duty to also undergo anti-propagandistic activities against the ideological trends of the times, particularly against the communist movement; activity resorted to the Major Staff compelling the chiefs of Counties and Territories to deal this state danger. In this regard, the NRF General Secretary Aurelian Bentoiu, through an official letter addressed to all the counties and municipals' presidents reminded that: "The Major Staff acknowledged the communist propaganda continued very intensely, in the regions where there were troops displaced and the main target of this propaganda was, beside grabbing the civil population favour, the armed forces demoralization as the pillar of each state existence". The communist propaganda goal consisted in: "instigating the civilian population and the armed forces against the present form of state in our country; the support of population and the armed forces for the USSR; the action to instigate to strikes, sabotage and terrorism particularly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 330.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, dosar 2/1939-1940, f. 330.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> *Idem*, dosar 6/1939-1940, f. 69.

regarding the war industry and the industry co-working for the national defence and communications"<sup>27</sup>. The propagandistic means used by the communist were varied and were seen in: "manifests, posts of radio – clandestine emissions, communist nuclei to the villages, cities and enterprises; person to person propaganda, different brochures with inoffensive titles covers, the clandestine newspaper "Scânteia", different foreign publications; agencies and funds of certain foreign powers and finally the wide scale use of the Jewish element, the eternal moral dissolvent of all the nations wherein they lived and the creator of indefinite situations, As support for their propaganda, the communists used the following arguments: "inefficiency of war, characterizing it imperialist and lead against the masses' liberties; the USSR preponderance in the South-Eastern of Europe; the necessity for Romania to sign in alliance with the Soviets, the single pacific country able to protect us; the displease of the present political context, the useless of concentrations showed as preparations for war therefore against the proletariat interests, showing the soldiers life in the darkest colours because of the lack of trust in the armed forces' endowment, armaments, fortifications and commandants' value, displease of population came from the more expensive life and its hardships; the insufficiency of measures taken by government to help the concentrates' families",29. On the other, hand, the measures proposed by the Major Staff consisting in: "actions concentrated with the armed force and the other administrative authorities, gendarmerie, police, religious schools of the country; intense propaganda for NRF ideology, by means to convince and strengthen the trust into the new construction of the State, by regaining those which were for a time detoured from the Romanian way"<sup>30</sup>.

If the anti-propaganda was the army's competence, controlling the former political parties was the competence of the single party and the government. The elements occupying by exercitation of control were clerks as well as the royal resident. From the research of archives it resulted the resident's reports contributed to the governmental policy. The official letter sent by the NRF General Secretary to NRF Region and County secretaries specified that "in some counties there were elements that activated in the former political parties and who despite join the action, isolated themselves from NRF movement criticising the new political movement" Certain agents of some dismantled political groups did not lose the occasion to manifest their distrust regarding NRF. The method to disseminate distrust around the good will people (in cities, and villages) must be counteracted by all means. Romanians should be united around the Throne and this nation's leaders. They have the duty to unmask the disseminators of phony news; to find out the names of all spreading these damaging rumours for the nation's unit; they have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 69.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 69.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*. f. 70.

 $<sup>^{30}</sup>$  Ibidem, f. 70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 130.

the obligation to know the NRF program, to spread its ideology in order to form a healthy public spirit<sup>32</sup>.

The report to the Ministry or Interior denies the true role played by the National Guard which was unable to fulfil its obligation it was created for. The Guard lacked that dynamism which should have been the main characteristic of this organization. The program was insufficiently attractive and made the Guard members to be used more as decor to different manifestations of the Front rather than in real, imposing and attractive activity<sup>33</sup>. Thus, "the members were authorised to deal as observatories of contraventions to the specula law, the report arguments, because the units were formed by peoples aging more than 50 years, 50 years peasants tired and unable for an activity wherein was required mobility, initiative spirit and enthusiasm"<sup>34</sup>. The report requested the settlement of a pleasant program because of it depend the success or failure of its execution. By comparison, "from other countries experience, we could draw the conclusion in the rural environment as well in the urban environment the targeting exercises, practice of adequate sports for situations, guard, control, general safety services, cultural and social activities, choruses, fanfare and different contests for stimulation presenting more interest. To gatherings of councils it was recommended for all the participants to be actively involved"35.

The National Guard attributions consisted in serving as order bodies of NRF cooperating on wartime with the military bodies to maintain the public safety and peace. In conformity with the new law of NRF, the Service, in the National Guard, was considered as a honour trusted only to the determined people to sacrifice for the superior interests of the country and for the King<sup>36</sup>. In the NSDAP, for example, "orders were trusted only to elite formations of the party, which were compelled to listen to the Fuhrer orders and to execute the will of the political leadership and the party<sup>37</sup>, argues the theorist of totalitarianism origins.

#### "SELECTION" OF MEMBERS AND "ORGANIZATION" OF NATIONAL GUARD

From an activity report of the Secretary of Someş Territory for all the categories (agriculture and manual work, industry and commerce and intellectual occupations) we can find out more details as regards the relations between NRF and the National Guard as follows: "Guard Commandants were not very well selected because they seemed to be more important as they were and interfered in matters where they did not have abilities"<sup>38</sup>. The persons revealed that "the Guard'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 130.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> *Idem*, Fond FRN, Dosar nr. 23/1940, f.141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, Dosar 1/1939, f. 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Originile totalitarismului*, traducere de Ion Dur și Mircea Ivănescu, Editura Humanitas, București, 2006, p. 494.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> *Idem*, Fond FRN, Dosar nr. 18/1939, f. 138.

members were not recruited very careful from the most correct and dynamic persons and the combating of specula offered the occasion to signal the abuses of some Guard' employees" <sup>39</sup>. The report signalled the need for perfect delimitation of Guards' attributions into the NRF therefore they could fulfil their missions. On the other hand, by a *Marea Territory Report* on March 14, 1940, we can found out "the National Guard was subordinated to the local presidents and there was needed for the president to know who deserves and who did not deserve to be in the Guard, from here resulted the presidents confirmed the young members of the Guard'<sup>40</sup>. At one hand, the report reminded about the recruitment in the Guard of the elder peoples retired from the elements of the armed forces. On the other hand, the report showed to the Guard that it should settle a service of intelligence as well as order units composed by younger and sportive elements to know box and to train in defence means in order to be apt, to make listen the problematic elements<sup>41</sup>.

The political activity of the National Renaissance Front undergone following the armed forces' methods and means and coordinated the National Guard members' activity and the member of the armed hand were part of Carol's single party and, moreover, they were paid by the political organization as state and party clerk. Militaries lead the single party as well as the National Guard.

On the one hand, the agitators and electoral bullies of the political parties dismantled were replaced with *educated elements* by the single party in order to provide order and, on the other hand, the selection, recruitment of Guard's members were not fulfilled on meritocratic principles such generating corruption into the armed hand of the Front. The official attributions of the Guard consisted in the maintenance of order in territories and the unofficial ones regarded the monitoring of party and regime's members and opposites. The control and surveillance activities were specified in the NRF and of National Guards program itself. The communist and legionaries monitoring by the National Guards in collaboration with the General Staff regarded the control of their subversive activity by propaganda developed against the change of state monarchy order.

The critical element brought for this regime's institution from inside the organization consisted in the unfulfilled program and attributions the National Guard was endowed with. The main dimension of royal Guards was to spread the NRF ideology, mean by which was tried the formation of the youth spirit in Front's manner in conformity with the doctrinarian principles of Guard and single party. The youth ascendance in functions of the party and guard wanted to be concordantly to the populist rhetoric promoted by the regime. The Guard's members have more decorative than constructive role but parody role also played the corporatist Parliament as well as the single political organization and the new authoritarian regime represented the decor of the old democratic regime.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 138.

<sup>40</sup> Idem, dosar nr. 6/1939-1940, f. 199.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 199.

The politics of militarization and the control over the state institutions suffer modifications once with the transformation of the single party in totalitarian organization. The National Renaissance Front and its armed hand, the National Guard, transformation took place once with the apparition of single totalitarian organization. All the leading bodies appointed by NRF – presidents, commandants, secretaries, members of guards and communal councils - had the obligation to remain to their posts and to continue the activity in the Nation Party framework. By high royal decision, in July 11, 1940, the NRF National Guard passed into the authority of the Nation Party with its new name as Nation Party Guard. The Guard was subordinated to the chief of General Staff of Nation Party. General Petre Georgescu was appointed by General-Commandant of Nation Party Guard<sup>42</sup>. If on 11 June took birth the National Guard of Nation Party following the Soviet ultimatum to the beginning of September if only after three months of activity it will cease its activity. Petre Georgescu ordered on September 2, 1940, the application of Decision 24 of National Guard Commandment after the Vienna arbitrage judgement made public on 30 August by which "Romania was bound to evacuate in 15 days term part of the national territory and to give up to Bulgaria a part of the Dobrogea territory. In conformity with the decision, it was suspended the activity of the National Party Guard from Sălaj, Satu-Mare, Maramures, Somes, Năsăud, Cluj, Mureș, Odorhei, Ciuc, Tei Scaune, Caliacra and Durostor. The chief of major staff was compelled to fulfil this decision<sup>43</sup>.

## CONCLUSIONS

The state controlled bureaucracy by means of the party and the National Guard was greatly populated with officers from the Romanian armed forces. As in administration, the single party construction with state staff was done by appointments and promotions as well as in the period of democratic parliamentary regime functioning in conformity to the studied reports. Although it was proclaimed as a new regime, it behaved as had been the regime of the old system. The official ideology of the regime was exercised by the government over the population by the means of National Guards and single party members but also with the support of residents from the territories. The creation of the single party and its doctrine wanted to be an alternative to the times' ideologies. NRF represented the relation between individuals and local elites who have as objectives to exercise the ideological mobilization by the mean of the single party. On the other hand, the state-party functioning owed to the symbiosis between the military and the single party elites which represented the authority instrument in the government opera. NRF was not just instrument for administrative control but also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, Dosar 848/1940, f. 21.

<sup>43</sup> *Idem*, Dosar 850/1940, f. 27.

source of propaganda with the duty to undergo anti-propagandistic activities against the ideological trends of the times particularly against the communist and legionary movement, activities which were part of the Major Staff which obliged the counties and territories chiefs to occupy by this state danger's management.

The National Guard was the politicized institution of the regime and single party which proved the inefficiency because of the General-Commandant subordination to party. Militaries lead the single party as well as the National Guard. The study of archived documents confirmed the Guard lacked dynamism and the program was insufficiently attractive for its members who were used in many manifestations.

The National Guard did not succeed to fulfil its tasks for which was created, yet the main attribution of it consisted in the spread of NRF ideology by which was tried the education of youth spirit in conformity the doctrinarian principles of the Guard and the single party. The accession of youth in functions in the single party and National Guard framework represented one of the unfulfilled projects of the regimes. By the state means, "the party disseminated the ideology by the support of constraining, publicity and propaganda means"<sup>44</sup>. The implementation of regime's ideology in all the society's layers represented the attribute of the new institutions: "National Guards, NRF and the Studies Circles. The new institutions were put into ideologies and served to the goal of installing the country order by the means of coercive bodies of surveillance and control.

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